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Abstract:
A narrative presenting the development and reforms of the budgetary process
and related organisational changes in the city of Gothenburg is subjected to an
analysis inspired by Rawls’ Theory of Justice. It is found that the centre of
decisions on priorities have shifted over time, but above all it is found that the
drive towards ”procedural justice” may provide an approach that will allow
more interested parties than the traditional ”advocates” and ”guardians” to
participate.
Introduction
Managers increasingly find themselves embedded in complex environments. The standard models
of managerial decision making assume, beside the usual troublesome assumptions on rationality,
that decision making takes place in a clean hierarchical order with a policy making unit at the top.
From these heights coherent goal structures are handed down and all the base of the hierarchy has
to do is to chose the best alternative among those presented to them. We, as academics, forgetting
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our own Byzantine faculty meetings, are quick to condemn the abuse of proper decision making
practised by ”practical men”. But our models are normative. We build them for an ideal world. We
assume markets in equilibrium, single-purpose organisations, and abilities to see into the future,
and then we are surprised that organisations hold on to mutually contradictory goals at the same
time. With a voice trembling with outrage we demand, in the name of de-regulation, that markets
be better regulated so that they become more Market-like. When markets fail we blame it on non-
market features (like inside information) forgetting that if all participants on a market had the same
information, obviously, there would be no trade. The whole point of markets is the difference in
information and values. Without insiders no market (admittedly insider gains in the capital market
can be provocative!).
When organisations fail we rationalise them (Scott and Meyer 1994)! This means that we restore
rationality through reform. Reforms are there by design and failure provides an opportunity to
promote the adoption of a new design. Arguments are gathered from explanations to the failure as
well as from brave new world that will materialise after the reform has been implemented
(Hedberg and Jönsson 1978). Our fantasies about the future, after the reform, are dependent upon
the current discourse on the goodness of organisational solutions. In this way both the realities of
failure and the dreams of success colour our designs.
There have been many opportunities and reasons to rationalise municipalities over the last few
decades in Sweden. The welfare state was built and expanded to unprecedented proportions here
and it distributes benefits largely through the municipalities. Gothenburg has, until recently, been
the largest municipality in Sweden with the number of employees varying between 40 and 50
thousand (this includes health care, which is normally a county task). A large organisation by any
measure, and likely to be effected by new organisational fashions as well as financial realities.
The welfare state is a rationalist project. It welcomes rationality. The pinnacle being the introduction
of program budgeting in the 1960s (Wildavsky 1975). Nowhere in the world, according to
Wildavsky, can we find an application of the impeccable rationalist ideas of program budgeting that
was successful on its own criteria. We have only one world and program budgeting has been tested
in it. It didn’t work! Was it implementation error? Hardly! Implementation is part of the world and
can be rationalised.
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Putnam (1993) explains institutional efficiency by socio-cultural factors summarised under the
label civic traditions after having studied regions in Italy over a 20 year period. Maybe the
experience of failure in administrative reforms should not be viewed in the light of the
instrumentality of designs (given an idealised environment), but from the perspective of institution
building (i.e., rule making) over time? Such institution building could be assumed to be driven by a
demand for just allocation of collective resources (Rawls 1973). The problem seems to be where
the allocation mechanism should be located. When solving this problem politicians seem to
become victims of their own designs, or, more correctly, of their advisors’ designs. The world
does not stop changing long enough for designs to be implemented and trimmed to efficiency.
Municipal organisation is a good topic to study in this respect since it has responded to demands
for collective solutions to tasks as well as the modernisation of the welfare state with the
consequent complexity and adaptive difficulties.
First the municipal level of organisation focused on collective tasks (roads, water, sanitation, fire
brigade). Those activities were seen as separate activities with little need for co-ordination and few
priority problems. Modernisation through the welfare state introduced priorities, strain on resources
and, thus, the need for policy making through democratic processes. The complexity of the
problem of prioritisation (when you are also responsible for carrying decisions out) generated an
ever-increasing demand for administrative tools that could take over some of the resource
allocation work. Such tools (like program budgeting) were thought of as freeing politicians from
routine and enabling them to focus on the important aspects of policy making – the rest would be
mechanism. But at times centralisation of control is the preferred solution, and then decentralisation
appears to be the way to go. Reforms, which relocate the locus of the mechanism where justice is
born, follow each other and leave sediments of routines and practices in the organisation. This adds
to complexity as organisations, also municipalities, try to cope with a complex environment
through fragmentation of action to many levels. It seems like our modernist ambitions tend to force
us into overwhelming complexity (and the solution then is better tools!).
In Gothenburg the difficulties started when the expansion of the welfare state took off after the
second world war. Until the crisis of the late 1950s our sources told us that the tradition was that
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the ”real” budget decisions were taken at a dinner with the City Collegium members at the home of
the Chief administrator. Department heads ”gamed” to get scheduled for their presentation during
the final coffee with ”avec” when politicians were in a good mood. Expenditures were added
together and the tax rate fixed accordingly. Modernisation came with co-ordinating planning
(Jönsson and Lundin 1975) and professionalisation of the administrative staff. Soon the ability to
spend surpassed the ability to find financial solutions and the pragmatic kind of politics
(Gothenburg spirit) were succeeded by party politics, which was, in turn, supplemented with
”economic democracy” (an euphemism for increased union influence on political decisions), and
by user and citizen participation. It seems like the city of Gothenburg has been aiming for ”pure
procedural justice” (Rawls 1973) during the last 25 years:
The purpose of this paper is
1) to put together a narrative of the various budgetary reforms (and related organisational reforms)
based on  own research into management control in the city of Gothenburg since the early 1970s.
2) to apply Rawls’ theory of justice in order to understand how the centre for just allocation was
located at different times and to gain insight into the dynamics of institution building over time.
The empirical basis consists of a series of studies which the author have done in co-operation with
others; first of the interaction between physical and financial planning (Jönsson and Lundin 1975),
then of the budgetary process over a 3 year period (Jönsson 1982), then of the politics of changing
policy (Brunsson and Jönsson 1979), and finally of a decentralisation reform (Jönsson et al 1995,
Jönsson et al. 1997).
The narrative.
In the wake of the Korea boom in the early 1950s the ambitions of the welfare state grew. The blue
prints of the cascade of welfare state reforms were worked at the centre (parliament) and
implemented through the municipalities. To carry the burden of more professional management
municipalities had to be larger than they were before. One of the reforms, carried out over a period
of years was the merger of municipalities. Optimism was abundant and even if the tax base grew
the pressure upwards on taxes was strong. Municipalities levy an income tax and during the 1950s
the rate was rapidly approaching 15 %. Two professors of the business school sounded the alarm
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in a little book called ”Must tax rates increase?” (Trolle & Goldberg 1958). Tax payers would
revolt if this trend continued! (The tax rate in 1998 is more than 30 %) Something had to be done!
Municipalities had to be more effective. They needed management! This was probably first felt in
Gothenburg, a city with the biggest municipal administration (in terms of employees) in Sweden
since it included health care (usually a county responsibility in Sweden). The business school was
contacted. It set up a research institute oriented towards administrative studies. A group of young
researchers got their first research experience in municipal rationalisation (should the slaughter
house be closed down? What should a new accounting system for health care look like?). Several
of these management scholars were hired by the city into central managerial jobs during the first
years of the 1960ies. They provided the core of the professionalisation effort in the city of
Gothenburg. However, the increased management capacity did not lead to a stabilisation of the
finances, on the contrary it seemed like improved management increased the capacity to spend! The
different offices could argue for grants by using co-ordination as argument (now when the Streets
department is digging in X-street it is a good idea to replace those old water pipes and sewers the
Water department has there! And a new pump is necessary since the volumes are increasing,
and...).
Toward the end of the 1950s a new approach caught attention. A team of a senior politician
interested in finances and a newly recruited city accountant argued that the financial difficulties are
imminent. The cause for this is that plans are made first and then financing is discussed afterwards.
Since plans consisted of urgent projects from different departments that supported each other the
politicians tended to find themselves in situations where priorities could not be applied. The process
should be reversed! First determine the budget frame, one operational budget frame for each
department and a joint capital investment frame for the city. Then the departments should present
their budget proposals inside the allocated financial frame! Then the City Council would be in
control! A budget reform to this effect was initiated. In a short time city finances improved
considerably. This was seemingly due to a general lack of knowledge of accounting outside the
accounting department – depreciation charges (which do not result in cash expenditure) were
counted as costs for the departments, but the corresponding cash flow stopped at the Finance
department. The ”Gothenburg Spirit” (phrase coined by the chief editor of one of the local
newspaper, who was also a representative of the Liberal party) developed –it meant that politicians
first agreed, across political parties, on the financial frame for the budget (tax rate and amount of
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borrowing), and only then was it permitted to start arguing about priorities. Everybody seemed to
like it. It had a good disciplining effect!  Like a miracle central reserves accumulated. These could
be used for urgent projects that could be steered beside the budget frames! Soon, from the middle
of the 1960s, finances deteriorated again.
Up to now there was a secure socialist majority in the council, but now a new kind of politicians
entered the scene, academics, and people with management experience, especially in the Liberal
party, gained power. A non-socialist coalition won the majority in the 1966 election. Their first
managerial act was to initiate a reorganisation of the top management of the city (some minor
reforms had been implemented during the early 1960s). Now the aim was to have an Executive
Committee of the City Council that is in control. A powerful executive committee, with several full
time (salaried) politicians was established, and the central city offices were streamlined. The new
organisation was in operation from 1971. The budget procedure had also developed, under the
influence of Program Budgeting, and was now labelled (in translation), Program and Frame
budget. The first budget decision in the spring did not only contain a budget frame, like before, but
also a statement of priorities (and thereby became a more “political” document. Now the scene was
set for improved quality in resource allocation as well as a better grip on the finances! It should be
noted that the City of Gothenburg was a very large organisation in terms of employees, between 40
and 50 thousand. The two large agencies were health care and social services, each towards 20.000
employees. The problem was that the oil crisis in 1969 had wrecked the economy (Sweden being
very dependent on oil imports, e.g., for heating) and the second crisis in 1973 did not improve the
situation. An overorganised welfare state, with full employment and strong unions, and in the
process of implementing legislation on economic democracy under the leadership of Olof Palme,
was not well equipped to adapt to external shocks quickly. Industrial adaptation was under way,
however. The shipyards (3 large ones in Gothenburg) were being dismantled and the steel industry
was being restructured. Unemployment reached new (post-war) record levels. Negotiations were
the hottest news item. What was recently ”the housing problem” turned into a ”problem of empty
flats” (Jönsson & Lundin 1975a). The national policy was to ”bridge over” the economic down
turn.  Part of the solution was to absorb some of the laid off work force in the public sector (it was
primarily child care that expanded).
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Our more intensive studies with the preparation of the budget for 1976, which was done in 1975
under the impression of 13 % of inflation p.a. and wage demands for 15 % increase. The budget
frame for  1976 was based on the assumption that wages (and prices) would increase by 6 % (not
to worry, budget managers with foresight had tucked away another 4 % in the account for
”Unforeseen expenditure”). The upcoming wage negotiations would not go well if the employer
side published, in advance, that they expected X % in increases.). Our expectation was that the
budget process would collapse under the pressure. It did – in a sense!
Up till now the narrative has been given for back ground, now the budget process becomes the
”figure” and more detail is necessary. First the general structure of the process (Jönsson 1982,
Jönsson & Lundin 1976, Jönsson & Malmer 1978, Jönsson 1978): In the Swedish municipal
system at the time every department (Social services, Schools, Water, Streets, Culture etc. we have
observed at most 21 departments in the city) was headed by  a Committee of elected politicians
(same proportions between parties as in the City Council) who participated in the planning process
through their regular committee meetings (usually once a month). The control centre of the city is
the Executive Committee consisting of 15 senior politicians (seats proportional to City Council
strength). The Executive Committee manages the city on behalf of the City Council and has a City
Office (some 130 officers) to assist. The time schedule for the budget process was the following:
In January the Executive Committee took decisions on which assumptions on population changes,
employment, inflation, housing etc were to be applied in budgeting. In February the Executive
Committee proposed guiding priorities and budget frames (expenditure limits) for the
committees/departments (the City Council took the formal decision in early March). In late May
the committees/departments present their program budgets (5 year plans) with priorities, but
usually with expenditure far above the expenditure limits for the next year. In August the tax
authorities issue the definite estimates of the tax outcome for the next year and the Executive
Committee majority, on this basis, issued definite guidelines for priorities and instructed
departments to present their final budget proposal within expenditure limits by mid-September.
(The minority takes this opportunity to present a different opinion.). Through late September and
early October a sub-committee (the Budget Committee) ”negotiates” with committees/departments
on budget cuts to come down to expenditure limits. The budget and proposed tax rate were
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presented in late October and the City Council took the decision in late November after the most
important political debate of the year.
Not much can be said against this procedure. It is rational in the sense of the program budgeting
idea dominating at the time. In the Spring priorities were discussed on a long term basis, and in the
Fall, when financial details were known, next year priorities guided the final cuts. The structure
fitted Wildavsky’s (1975) budgetary roles (”advocates” and ”guardians”) very well, with the
departments as ”advocates” arguing for improvements of their sector, and the Executive
Committee as ”guardians” of the Treasury, arguing that there is no more money. We followed the
process closely during the Fall and more on a distance during the rest of the year over a period of
three years (Jönsson 1982).
The situation for making the 1976 budget was more serious than ever, which was the lead theme of
the memorandum of the Executive Committee in August 1975. There was no room for
sophisticated balancing of priorities. Every department must 1) cut their budget proposals down to
the expenditure limits given through the March decision of the City Council, and then 2) a further
1.5 %! Departments were encouraged to increase revenues by increased charges for services. The
tax rate should be increased from the planned 23 % to 24 %. The original expenditure limits
presupposed increased borrowing, but at this stage no increased borrowing beyond that was
proposed. The Budget Committee instructed the departments to present revised budget proposals at
2 % below the preliminary expenditure limits to have a negotiation margin. During the budget
process in September we could observe a number of ”budget tricks” being used by departments.
Most of them were successful in the sense that ”advocates” managed to avoid cuts and even
increase their expenditure limits. Two examples illustrate how individual departments gamed to
avoid cuts and comparisons with priorities in other areas;
The Leisure department head called a press conference to present how the department would
manage to come down to the expenditure limits a couple of days before the scheduled meeting with
the Budget Committee. The main cut would be achieved by eliminating staff of some down town
youth clubs (where kids could spend time after school) and ”outsource” them to voluntary
organisations. This was a hot political issue, the majority favouring outsourcing and the minority
(social democrats) favouring the city running these clubs with its own personnel (1976 was an
election year). The press mobilised, interviews with unions and social workers (”Outrage!”), youth
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occupied their clubs. The Budget Committee, trying to defuse the situation, found that it was wise
to increase the expenditure limit for Leisure to provide room for voluntary organisations as well as
own personnel. The Health committee/department came to the Budget Committee with outrageous
cuts in high priority areas. This was very provocative and the chairman of the health committee
(belonging to the majority of the Council) was forced to withdraw the proposed cuts and replace
them with a general promise to save the same amount of money through rationalisation (which
was probably the intended outcome in the first place). The health department, thus, started the year
with an unbalanced budget without priorities guiding where cuts were to be taken. The chairman of
the health committee realised that career opportunities in the city were limited from now on.
The outcome of the whole process was an ”underbalanced” budget that was formally balanced by a
”general deductions for vacancies” on the expenditure side in selected departments. (Positions are
vacated during the year and often not filled with a new person right away, thus savings will be
made, however the ”deductions” were judged unrealistic for 1976 by the Budget Office). The
general observation from this year was that departments were cleverly using media and public
outrage to defend their proposals and there were little comparison of needs across functional areas.
The political majority consisted of a coalition of parties, which, obviously, was not organised to
make quick re-evaluations of priorities during budget negotiations in the Fall. Trickery had won the
day and the ”guardians” were weakened. The budget dialogue was between the Budget Committee
and the departments, not between political majority and minority. We called it budgeting by
confrontation. How was it secured that a just allocation between services was achieved, and on
what basis could expenditure limits for the individual department be adjusted? We had to see what
would happen during the next round, the 1977 budget. What would be the effect of the election in
September 1976? Could the Budget Committee avoid to be locked in by its own time schedule
with lack of time to negotiate final priorities?
The budget office had seen the effects of time pressure in 1975 and proposed that the draft budgets
for 1977 should be ”prioritised” 3 % above and below the expenditure limit. In this way the
Budget Committee would be in a better position to weigh cost/benefit effects between departments.
We suspected that it was too optimistic to expect the departments to leave themselves at the mercy
of the Budget Committee by ranking marginal budget packages (remember that zero-based
budgeting was à la mode at this time!), but there was no fault with the rationality of the argument.
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The procedure was the same as the foregoing year. During the Summer the election campaign
geared up and the ”prioritising” got ”politicised”, which should be seen as a good thing in a
democracy. The Budget Committee instructed departments to come in with +/- 3% prioritised final
proposals, but it kept to the tradition of not showing ”real” expectations as to inflation and wage
increases by holding to a 6 % estimate and hiding the rest among ”Reserves for unexpected
expenditure”. The May estimates exceeded the preliminary expenditure limits by about 8 %, which
worried the Budget Office. In its August memorandum the Budget Committee proposed to solve
the unbalance by another tax increase (to 25 %), increased borrowing, cuts below expenditure
limits (smaller than last year), and a smaller reserve for unexpected expenditure. The election
campaign was approaching its climax. Still it was possible to reach an agreement on the financing,
but the minority did not accept the allocation between programmes. A theme in the campaign was
whether the financial situation was serious or not. The majority was cornered to claim that things
looked pretty good (while pushing hard for cuts in the budget). In the meantime the financial
situation got worse every day (the budget for 1976 was unbalanced from the start!). The Budget
Office was frustrated since they could not get the full attention of the leading politicians. The
departments were asked to come back with their final budgets no later than 1st  October (after the
election). The Budget Office did not expect much help from the spending departments. The election
resulted in victory for the minority, and that meant that the final rounds of cuts were going to be
done by a care taker government. Normally the incoming majority would have the final say on the
budget it would be managing, but this time the excited atmosphere of the campaign grew nasty
over a down town building site (underground garage that would draw traffic to the city centre)
where the minority turned sympathetic towards an occupation of the site even though they had
participated in the decision to start the project. There was also disagreement on the procedures of
the Executive Committee. As a result the outgoing majority decided to ride on formalities and take
”responsibility” for the 1977 budget.
 An interesting feature of these budget proposals was that many departments asked for
compensation for last years cuts, as well as the assumptions on which the budget was supposed to
rest, which were often termed ”unrealistic”. The health care committee/department argued that the
assumptions were so unrealistic that they had decided to follow them strictly and disclaim all
responsibility for the consequences. The group of the city office in charge of analysing the
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investment budget reported that they found it impossible to come down to the expenditure limit. (In
our report at the time we labelled the situation ”budgeting under disillusionment”). The Budget
Committee gave up on many fronts and was saved by the Bank of Sweden who granted
permission to take an extra foreign loan (in Swiss francs which could be arranged quickly, before
the end of 1976, but which later turned out to be expensive due to the weakening of the Swedish
crown). The budget, thus, was better financed than was feared at the start of the process, but the
debt burden had increased and interest rates were high.
While the outgoing majority dealt with the budget the incoming social democrats focused on
reform. In the campaign they had charged the ruling coalition with wrecking the economy of the
city. A stricter control over expenditure was required. Their solution was to gain a tighter grip on
the spending departments through their committees. The ruling coalition agreed with the ends but
not with the means. It claimed that the role of the Executive Committee (and its Budget
Committee) was to balance the allocation of resources between the service areas. In order to
accomplish this the Executive Committee must stand above the ”advocates” for the schools, social
services etc who resided in the department committees. The Social democrats saw this differently.
Their view was that priorities are decided by the party and then all members go out and implement
those priorities wherever they serve. There is no role conflict between serving on the Executive
Committee and the School Board. On the contrary! By assuring that the priorities of the majority
are applied in the day to day operations of the agencies the implementation of the program of the
majority will be enhanced. The non-socialist coalition saw the opposite happen; if a school
politician would be allowed in the Executive Committee, he/she would continue to argue the school
case and weaken the Executive Committee, which would turn into an arena for bargaining between
partisan advocates, and would solve its differences by expanding the budget. Since the social
democrats were in majority their way was implemented. Senior politicians from the Executive
Committee could take up positions in the functional committees. Priorities are set in the party! We,
the researchers, simply had to follow what would happen when the 1978 budget was worked out
under this new regime!
As a matter of fact the work on the 1978 budget turned out to be rather boring as a research topic.
Nothing much happened since the problem of the financial crisis was solved by the largest tax
increase in the history of the city. This could be carried out by the new majority blaming
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mismanagement by the old majority. Some aspects should be pointed out, though. Policy making
was done close to the meetings of the Executive Committee under the old coalition majority.
Parties had to compromise and party representatives had to refer back to their group in the City
Council. This provided for a prime role for the City Office to provide information and expert
advice. Under the new majority, priorities were worked out elsewhere and the City Office was just
told what to do under the given policies. Its role diminished. The formal decision apparatus had
been turned into a tool for implementation of policies (no longer a policy making structure). On the
other hand the spending departments grew in policy making stature. They could provide the right
information directly to ”their” politicians to be argued in the party caucus.
A further dimension was added during the last years of the 1970s. Economic democracy was
being implemented also in the public sector. The core idea of this legislation was that decision
makers were obliged to negotiate with the unions before formal decisions to, significantly, change
working conditions for the employees were taken. This meant that budget proposals had to be
negotiated with personnel before they were decided upon, especially if cuts were contemplated! The
unions did not have veto power, but they could delay and make things difficult by mobilising the
press and clients on behalf of their  demands. The advocates (Wildavsky 1975) had been
strengthened again!
It would not surprise if elected politicians struck back with a new deal aiming at bringing the
authority to allocate resources back to the ”people” at this moment, would it? What happened was
that, almost as an extension of economic democracy, the debate on political
decentralisation/participation took off again. Already before the reform of merging small
municipalities to larger units that could carry the costs of professional administration had been fully
implemented there were suggestions, especially from non-socialist politicians, to introduce sub-
municipal committees to improve participation as well as local adaptation of solutions. The
standard organisational structure of municipalities (as far as its committees are concerned; school
board etc) was ”de-regulated” in  a new law of ”Local organs”, adopted in 1979, and the
government started experimenting with alternative solutions from 1984 (”Free municipalities”
could propose new structures and get them sanctioned by the government for a trial period.)
Gothenburg took its decision on this decentralisation/participation issue in 1987. Local committees,
charged with managing the ”soft sector” activities of the city were to start from 1990 (with 1989 as
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a year to get organised.) There would be 21 districts, each with a political committee mirroring the
strength of the parties of the whole city (no direct local elections), and appointed by the City
Council. This was a major organisational change and the city signed a contract with the university
to evaluate the reform, which has been most thoroughly studied (Jönsson et al. 1995, Jönsson et al.
1997). The ideology of the welfare state seemed to have shifted. Instead of universal solutions
(equal treatment of everybody) the principle of local priorities had been adopted. This meant that
media could be expected to mobilise by comparing how much resources were spent on different
services in different districts (and that politicians from the different districts would be given
opportunities to justify differences in resource allocation?). There were also competing models with
quasi-markets in other cities. Gothenburg was the first major city to implement the local
committees solution, and, in time, most big cities in Sweden have adopted this solution (there are
variants).
The organisational principle for the local districts that was somewhat recommended by the reform
initiators was a ”geographical principle”. It seemed to be un-controversial that the local
administration should have a top managers, whom all functional departments (schools, social
services, culture, leisure) reported to, but the nature of the second layer of managers provided the
difference. If a ”geographical” principle were applied the district would be divided into sub-
districts, each sub-district with a ”general” manager supervising all functional areas. With a
”functional” principle the second layer managers would be specialists (schools, social services etc)
supervising the functional area for the whole district. There was a third principle called ”target
group” which would provide a vehicle for integrating, e.g., all activities directed towards ”youth”
under one second layer manager. The majority of districts chose the geographical principle. The
key word was integration (of the old warring departments) into common work towards the
wellbeing of the district population. There would be better service (local solutions), better efficiency
(integrated activities) and better democracy (participation) as a result. The implementation of the
reform included a one time reduction in the number of employees with several per cent, but soon
there was further budget cuts due to the financial crisis of the public sector during the first years of
the 1990s. One of the conclusions of our evaluation was that the reform had made it possible to
carry out austerity measures with less negative effects than would have been the case with the old
bid department, functional structure. The argument was that the cuts could be made closer to the
action and with better concern for the consequences. One general observation was that child care
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(kindergartens etc) lost resources to the benefit of schools during the first few years. There was
reallocation of resources now that the level of ”abundance” could be compared locally.
We (Jönsson et al. 1997, chapter 4) found that the district managers first concentrated on building
an organisation and recruiting holders of key positions, then a new accounting model was
introduced from the centre, a model that  supported a rather strict maintenance of financial
discipline (frame budgeting). Financially much energy was devoted to the getting of the ”right” bag
of money for the district. This was no easy task since the old departments had different systems.
The school department was the most difficult to deal with (it had, e.g., centralised purchasing of
heating oil for the schools without proper records of consumption for the different schools, with
the consequent difficulties of dividing up the ”oil” budget between districts.). Then the austerity
measures struck - 15 % were to be saved over a period of 3 years. We found that those districts
that had taken the difficult decision quickly and in one stroke and then sticking to that plan had
managed better than districts who thought it wise to start the process with an easy 3 % and then see
what could be done. By 1995 the reform had stabilised, one could see developing co-operation
between districts on common problems and district managers were well respected (almost like the
former department heads). Solutions were different in different district, in the Northeast district the
immigrant problems and the strain on the social services budget dominated (in the economic
downturn the increased number of refugees could not be offered jobs, schools would have a
dominance of non-Swedish speaking pupils etc), while in the south-western, rich, parts the
problems related to too hard cuts in comparison with the average. Also these districts had vocal
citizens who could mobilise protests.
Part of the political debate in the austerity years of the first half of the 1990s dealt with the unfair
allocation of the financial burdens for municipalities. Before, the state support for the municipal
sector had been biased towards the rural areas which lost jobs and inhabitants as industry
restructured and people moved to the bigger cities. Now politicians in the big cities argued that an
unfair burden of social costs, not least caused by the reception of refugees, who, even if they were
allocated to small towns initially soon moved to the big cities where they could find compatriots.
The model for state grants was reviewed, using regression models to allocate funds on the basis of
”objective facts” about the population. The same kind of debate was found in Gothenburg and the
same kind of solution was introduced! A resource allocation model was introduced from 1995 to
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make resource allocation based on ”facts” rather than the needs or plans of departments. The City
Office that had had a new period of comparative glamour during the first reform period, but was
loosing grip again when districts and their managers assumed centre stage positions, found a new
instrument for control. At the same time the districts that were complaining about unfair allocation
saw hope in a strictly ”objective” model.
The model was built in two parts and the parameters were tested with regression analysis so as to
minimise the reallocation between districts that would result from the changeover. The first part
(about 50 %) allocated resources strictly on the basis of number of inhabitants in the different age
categories; the same amount for each 7-year old in every district. The other part allocated resources
according to needs (every person above 75 years of age living alone gave a certain amount
(weight); child with jobless, single parent gave another amount etc). The model resulted in
significant reallocations for some districts, but not as expected, to the ”rich” districts but to those
districts with a high proportion of immigrants. The idea was, from a political point of view, was
that the parties could conduct a general debate on different needs (we want to increase the grant for
people with multiple handicaps!) and then this would be translated into a change in the ”weight”
for that category. From an administrative point of view it was interesting to compare the allocation
that the model provided (added into a lump sum allocation) with the actual outcome (differentiation
in politics between districts would expressed in deviations from the ”weights”). The model has
been used for too short a time to be properly evaluated yet, but it seems like it has come to stay.
One aspect that differs between cities that have adopted the model is how large a proportion of the
resources that are allocated on the basis of ”need”. Gothenburg is extreme in that as much as about
50 % is  on this criterion, while others allocate as little as 30 % on this basis. The most concrete
political effect of the model so far has been a request from three districts to sever ties with
Gothenburg and form their own municipalities. The matter was put to a referendum in last years
elections and the vote in those districts was for severance (but not with an overwhelming majority),
while a large majority in the other districts were against. This is where we stand today.
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Summary
For the benefit of the discussion of justice the following points should be noticed in summary:
1. The municipality of Gothenburg seems to have organised and reorganised to reach better control
over finances in the post-war period. The rhetoric and the perceived causes of the problems have
differed.
2. The first reform (late 1950s) came in the expansionist period after the Korea boom and aimed at
discipline in prioritisation by imposing a budget frame.
3. The next reform (late 1960s) aimed to centralise control to the Executive Committee.
4. The third reform (late 1970s and implemented by the state) introduced economic democracy and
gave unions the right to negotiate budget decisions.
5. The fourth reform (late 1980s) introduced decentralisation to districts where local political
committees were charged to allocate resources to local needs.
6. A fifth reform (middle of 1990s) introduced an ”objective” resource allocation model to
distribute resources between districts (lump sum), local priorities still celebrated.
The question is; have the political leaders found the most feasible location of justice now? If the
answer is yes, what are the arguments that this is the case?
A theory of justice
The general conception of justice in Rawls (Rawls 1973, p. 302f.) theory is:
”All social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is
to the advantage of the least favoured”
This conception is articulated in two principles and two priority rules
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First principle
”Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberties for all”
Second principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with a just savings principle (justice
between generations)
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity
First priority rule (Priority of Liberty)
Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty,
Second priority rule (Priority of Justice over efficiency and welfare)
an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with lesser opportunity, and
excess rates of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing those hardships.
The first principle gives liberty priority, which is expressed in the first priority rule.
The second principle is a slight reformulation of Pareto’s efficiency principle (see also e.g.
Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p. 24). Rawls’ theory of justice is a theory of justice because it
specifically deals with when inequality is justified (only when it is to the benefit of the least
favoured). It is not just a matter of final outcome (even between generations), but also the manner
in which the outcome was generated. This brings us to the concept of ”procedural justice”. Rawls
helps us understand the nature of ”pure procedural justice” by giving an example (p.85 f.):
Suppose that a number of persons are to divide a cake. Assuming that a fair division is an equal
one; What procedure will give this outcome? Obviously if the person who cuts the cake takes the
last piece! This is an example of perfect procedural justice. There is an independent criterion for
what constitutes a fair division, and there is a procedure that is sure to give the desired outcome
(given that all like cake). Imperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial; The
criterion is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and only if he committed the crime.
However even when the rules for hearing a case is adhered to carefully the court may reach the
wrong verdict. Procedural justice is imperfect. Pure procedural justice is when there is no
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independent criterion for the right result, but there is a fair procedure such that the outcome may be
considered fair provided that the procedure has been properly followed. An example would be
gambling. Even if the outcome is highly unequal the persons, who have been engaged in a series of
fair bets, will consider the game fair. ”The background circumstances define a fair procedure”
(Rawls 1973 p.86). But how are we to account for such background circumstances? No situation is
designed ”de novo”! We always enter a situation with precedents and differences in prestige or
endowments! Rawls solution is that we should assume an ”original position” in which we exclude
”knowledge of those contingencies which sets men and odds and allows them to be guided by their
prejudices” (p.19), i.e. the reasoning should be conducted under a ”veil of ignorance” of such
contingencies. We are then to seek a reflective equilibrium – a conception of justice cannot    be
deduced  from self–evident premises or conditions on principles; ...instead its justification is a
matter of mutual support of many considerations (p. 21). Such a reflective equilibrium is justified
by the fact that it was reached from an original position (of equality). It provides the rules of the
game, the outcome of which will be considered fair. But it will not be stable....
2. The first reform (late 1950s) came in the expansionist period after the Korea boom and aimed at
discipline in prioritisation by imposing a budget frame.
3. The next reform (late 1960s) aimed to centralise control to the Executive Committee.
4. The third reform (late 1970s and implemented by the state) introduced economic democracy and
gave unions the right to negotiate budget decisions.
5. The fourth reform (late 1980s) introduced decentralisation to districts where local political
committees were charged to allocate resources to local needs.
6. A fifth reform (middle of 1990s) introduced an ”objective” resource allocation model to
distribute resources between districts (lump sum), local priorities still celebrated.
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Application:
The first reform identified in the summary above was an outcome of patient arguing from one of
the leading politicians and a dedicated city accountant showing that the City Collegium (similar
function to the Executive Committee (except for Finance)) was unable to prioritise given the
current procedure to accept plans first and then find financing solutions. The very attractive solution
to determine the financial frame first and then adapt plans promised to keep the city leaders in
control. It required a reversal of procedures and a Spring dialogue on long term plans. So long as
these Spring talks generated commitment, in the ”Gothenburg spirit”, to the sacred financial frame
finances improved rapidly. The procedure had changed in side the established structure.
This, however, left the senior politician for Finance and the Finance Office in control, at the
expense of the City Collegium. When the social democratic majority was upset in the 1966 election
the first act (second reform) was to initiate a reorganisation to avoid the fragmentation that had
resulted from the dual political control (Finance and City Collegium) and the multiple offices in
City Hall. The result was the establishment of the Executive Committee (in firm control of policy
making) and a centralised City Office. The power structure had changed, but the resource allocation
procedure remained largely the same. The organisational change achieved a balance between
financial concerned (which had been favoured in the previous period) and the need for a better basis
for prioritisation between service areas through centralisation (also of the administrative structure).
Political attention was focused to the Executive Committee, which heard the arguments and
articulated priorities.
The procedure was put to the test in the economic crisis that followed the oil crises (where the
government tried to bridge the slump by expanding the public sector) and it failed, mostly because
there was a break down of the ”Gothenburg spirit” of  co-operation in determining the budget
frame (and the fact that the social democrats seemed to have regained power in the 1976 election by
claiming that the non-socialist coalition majority had mismanaged finances). The trust upholding
the budget procedure was compromised. ”Politics” had gained at the expense of the co-operative
management of the budget (for the good of the city?). The formal procedure remained unchanged
but the setting of priorities was dispersed from the Executive Committee to the party organisation
and negotiations with unions. Experimentation with forms of decentralisation were initiated. A
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period of weak and shifting majorities ensued (finances largely saved through tax increases). The
setting of priorities was dispersed again.
The comprehensive organisational reform, with 21 districts directly responsible to the Executive
Committee (for activities in ”soft” sector and finances), was implemented under the auspices of
financial crisis (derived from the crises of the  state, real estate and bank sectors) in the early 1990s.
Priorities were supposed to be locally adopted, resource allocation initially a one-to-one transfer of
resources to activity centres. Intense arguments from new district managers that resource allocation
was unfair (with facts to prove it) initiated a reform in terms of a new ”automatic” resource
allocation model, where central politicians were supposed to alter parameters of the model while
district politicians retain the task to adapt allocation to local needs. There is a strict financial regime
(and finances were, largely, brought under control over a 5-year period), but now solutions may
differ between districts. Citizens will not be treated uniformly equal, instead there is a focus on
differences in needs, integration of services, efficiency, and responsibility to the local population.
This seems to be manifested in the new resource allocation model, with its ”objective, and
detailed” way of calculating a lump sum to be allocated to a district, a lump sum that is based on
the characteristics of the population (not on the needs of spending departments). This lump sum
can then be ”re-prioritised” by the local politicians on the basis of local arguments. This provides
for a dialogue, that seems not yet to have been exploited, where locals justify their ”difference
principles” in relation to the model’s averages. Services may be integrated in a different way, or
efficiencies may take on another local pattern, or for that matter, justice may have a different
meaning. The outcome of such a dialogue may be an articulation of the identity of the district which
may further strengthen the feasibility of the solution. It will also help us question the modernist
conception of ”general welfare” which supposes standardisation of people into cases under the
structures of welfare legislation. We would not be much closer to Sen’s (1996) goal of freedom for
everyone to realise her or his human potential, but the opportunity to identify with one’s district is a
step in the right direction (Whetten & Godfrey 1998) even if it applies only to a few spokesmen for
the district .
Conclusion
Maybe it is because of professional biases that this author sees a pattern in the Gothenburg
discourse on the just allocation of resources through budgetary processes which is about procedural
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justice rather than justice in terms of outcome for individuals, departments or districts. It seems like
justice is a question (c.f. Whetten and Godfrey, 1998, p. 275) rather than a construct to be applied
in rigorous analysis. What organisations can hope for is to find solutions that are accepted for their
ostensible procedural justice while the dialogue on justice goes on. Whether the dialogue has
brought, or will bring, us closer to a just situation is a question which defies an answer. There is
probably little hope (even if we must keep trying) which the current situation in Gothenburg
illustrates;
In our evaluation of the latest reform the districts were described in terms of the ”resources” of
their citizens (measured by an index based in three variables; family income, proportion of welfare
recipients, and proportion of immigrants). The districts were ranked in four groups (resource-
strong to resource-weak, with two intermediate groups). It was found that the differences been
districts on this measure increased between 1989 and 1993, the period of reform when local
solutions were supposed to bring better equality. Granted that the reform coincided with an
economic crisis and new waves of refugees (who could not be offered jobs due to record levels of
unemployment), but the resource allocation through the city budget cannot be said to have
ameliorated the situation. When the resource allocation model was later applied (with a reformed
accounting system as a pre-requisite) three of the resource-strong districts asked for secession
(justified by the unfairness of the resource allocation between districts). What can we say; On the
one hand the measures pointed out that inequality had increased, but on the other hand, when the
details of the allocation became visible to the public solidarity suffered. The optimist could see this
as an opening for a serious discussion of the purpose of collective action on the municipal level (if
it is not reallocation of resources from the strong to the weak, what then?), but the pessimist might
find arguments for reduction of welfare efforts, reduction to municipalities providing the basic
services like water, sewerage, fire brigade and leave the soft sector to private initiative. That, in  a
sense, is retreating to ”pure procedural justice” (everyone for himself - after all there are insurance
solutions for most contingencies).
There is an argument for Rawls’ pure procedural justice in that ”perfect procedural justice” pre-
supposes 1) en independent criterion of justice, and 2) a procedure that will assure justice under that
criterion, while democracy presupposes disagreement on the criterion of justice (and a budget
procedure cannot be rearranged every time the majority changes). We cannot have the perfect and
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thus it remains to find a procedure that will find the just solution under varying criteria. But there
may be an improvement on this if we can limit the range of variation for criteria, to some standard
for minimal justice. This means that it is desirable to keep the conception of  justice as a question
rather than as a construct (suited for inclusion in rigorous analysis). The location of the dialogue
has shifted over the period described in the narrative. On an abstract level, and in a traditional
understanding, the interchange is between ”advocates” and ”guardians” (Wildavsky 1975), but the
shift observed in Gothenburg seems to be outwards, beyond spending departments and the
treasury, to local citizens, voluntary organisations, and media. In order for the dialogue on the
question of justice to be multi-located, concerned with allocation between services and categories
locally, and with allocation between districts and categories centrally, the procedure may have to be
transparent and pure. The vast increase in information and complexity of issues that follows from
the shift, may partly be handled by way of information technology, but the scarce resource to
worry about is the attention of concerned citizens.
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